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By E-Mail and Regular Mail 
 
February 1, 2001        
 
European Commission 
Internal Market DG 
Financial Services – Financial Reporting 
Attention: Mr. Michael Niehues 
Rue de la Loi 200 / Wetstraat 200 
B-1049 Bruxelles / B-1049 Brussel 
 
E-mail:  Michael.Niehues@cec.eu.int 
 
Dear Mr. Niehues: 
 
We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the European 
Commission’s consultative paper, “Statutory Auditors’ 
Independence in the EU:  A Set of Fundamental Principles.”  Our 
comments reflect the views of the Independence Standards Board’s 




It is gratifying to see the current focus on auditor independence 
throughout the world, and the degree of similarity in approach taken 
by the Commission, the Federation des Experts Comptables 
Europeens, the International Federation of Accountants, and the 
ISB.  We believe a principles-based threats and safeguards 
approach, that considers the expectations of investors and other 
stakeholders, is the most effective way to develop consistent and 
coherent standards that protect the public interest.  We endorse the 
Commission's test of independence; that is, whether "a reasonable 
and informed third party, knowing all the relevant facts and 
circumstances about a particular audit engagement, will conclude 
that the statutory auditor...is exercising objective and impartial 
judgment on all issues brought to his attention (A)."  
 
We are also pleased to see the Commission’s proposed adoption of 
requirements similar to those in ISB Standard No. 1, Independence 
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Discussions with Audit Committees, and ISB Standard No. 3, 
Employment with Audit Clients.  We agree with the Commission’s 
conclusion that independence can never be absolute – that the 
auditor cannot be completely free from all economic, financial, and 
other relationships that could appear to entail dependence of any 
kind.  Finally, we support, in most cases, an approach of limiting 
restrictions and prohibitions to those within the firm that are “in a 
position to influence the outcome of the audit.” 
 
Definition of Independence 
 
We believe that a clearer definition of auditor independence would 
improve the Commission’s framework.  The document differentiates 
between independence in mind and independence in appearance, but 
also describes independence as a means of demonstrating objectivity 
and professional integrity.  We understand the view that 
independence could be defined as compliance with a set of 
restrictions on relationships with audit clients as a means of 
demonstrating objectivity, but then we are not sure how this relates 
to the other components in the described model. 
 
The basic test of independence described in the first sentence of the 
document (A) states that the auditor should have “neither mutual nor 
conflicting interests with the audit client.”  We do not believe that 
this clause adds clarity to the test, as the auditor, for example, may 
have a mutual interest with the client in reliable financial reporting, 
and a conflicting interest in negotiating audit fees.  
 
The document uses the term “impair” or “impairment” when 
describing circumstances that would cause the auditor to be 
considered not independent.  When drafting the ISB’s conceptual 
framework, we found that many people understood the term 
“impairment” to describe circumstances that “affected” 
independence, rather than those that rose to the level of causing 
unacceptable independence risk.  In other words, the term implied 
that perfect independence was attainable, and that any threats 
affecting the auditor’s independence were unacceptable.  We found 
that the term “compromise” caused less confusion, in that people 
generally understood that we were describing circumstances that 
crossed a threshold (acceptable risk vs. unacceptable risk) in 
affecting the auditor’s independence. 
 
Evaluating the Acceptability of Independence Risk 
 
The Commission’s framework is consistent with the ISB’s in calling 
for an analysis of the significance of threats to independence, the 
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effectiveness of potential safeguards, and the acceptability of 
independence risk.  We suggest that the discussion regarding 
independence risk could be enhanced, however.  The term is not 
defined, and guidance is not provided on assessing the acceptability 
of independence risk.  Most importantly, the level of acceptable risk 
might vary based on cost / benefit considerations.  That is, the cost 
of additional safeguards (e.g., unintended consequences of 
regulations that ultimately decrease the quality of financial reporting 
and user reliance on audited financial statements) may exceed the 
benefit of reduced independence risk.  The framework, however, 
does not explicitly provide for cost / benefit analysis in setting 
standards.   
 
Cost / benefit analysis may be particularly helpful in articulating 
why safeguards should be, in some cases, less restrictive when 
auditing non-public-interest clients.  For example, the document 
states that self-review concerns arising from the provision of 
bookkeeping services are higher for public interest clients, and 
therefore the auditor should not perform these services, regardless of 
the level of assistance requested (B.7.21).  The rationale for more 
stringent requirements on public interest clients (and less restrictive 
standards on other audits) is not clearly articulated, beyond the 
potentially larger group of stakeholders associated with public 
interest clients who may have negative perceptions of these services.  
We believe such distinctions in the application of safeguards may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances, when costs and benefits are 
considered, but that this analysis and conclusion should be clearly 




A more robust analysis of threats and safeguards as they apply to 
specific situations would enhance the document.  The threats are 
generally listed in the black letter sections of the requirements (i.e., 
self –interest, advocacy, etc.).  Mandatory or suggested safeguards, 
including prohibitions and restrictions, follow.  Sometimes, 
however, the nature or origin of the threat is unclear.  For example, 
some might wonder why litigation poses a self-interest threat to the 
auditor’s independence.  The effect of the suggested safeguard may 
also need elaboration.  Even an auditor well versed in independence 
matters may wonder why discussion with the audit committee might 
adequately mitigate the threat posed by litigation (B.9).   
 
Guidance on how the auditor should consider appearances is 
sketchy.  In some cases, threats to the appearance of independence 
are discussed in a way that gives the impression that the relationship 
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in question does not pose an actual threat to independence.  For 
example, dependency on fees from a client, in our view, poses a real 
threat to the auditor’s independence, yet much of the discussion in 
this section focuses on the appearance of dependency (B.8.2). 
 
Standards should not permit an individual professional or the firm to 
act as auditor if threats to independence are not adequately 
mitigated.  In that connection, a strengthened threat and safeguard 
analysis when applying the principles to specific relationships might 
lead to changes in the requirements.  For example, the threats posed 
by significant financial interests in the audit client held by an 
engagement team member are not mitigated when the professional 
receives the financial interest by gift or inheritance.  The 
requirement to dispose of the financial interest at the earliest 
practicable date (which may not be in the near future), and to 
consider safeguards such as review of the individual’s work or 
exclusion of the professional from substantive decision making, 
does not seem to adequately address the threats, including those 
related to appearance (B.1.(2)).   
 
Similarly, a “significance test” in prohibiting certain business 
relationships between the audit client and those who could influence 
the outcome of the audit does not adequately address appearance 
threats, and fails a cost – benefit test.  Why allow the engagement 
partner to loan money to his or her audit client, or to guarantee the 
client’s debt, however insignificant (B.2.)? 
 
Finally, the threats raised by audit firm professionals assuming 
employment positions at their audit clients would seem to apply to 
other engagement team members, particularly more senior members, 
as well as to the engagement partner.  Why shouldn’t the firm 
review the relationships of these former firm professionals with 
remaining engagement team members?  Similarly, the threats posed 
by unsettled financial interests might apply to former firm 
professionals in important positions at the client regardless of 
whether they were previously involved in the audit, or part of the 
chain of command.  
 
The document states that a threat can be considered significant “if, 
considering all of its quantitative and qualitative aspects, it increases 
the level of independence risk to an unacceptable high level” (A.3.).  
We believe that this sentence is confusing, as it implies that:  
 
 threats may be analyzed and dismissed individually, as long 
as they do not raise independence risk to an unacceptably 
high level on a stand-alone basis; and 
 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 
(212) 596-6133  fax (212) 596-6137 
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org 
 
 
 independence risk should be assessed before the effect of 
safeguards. 
 
Responsibility for Compliance 
 
The framework sometimes places too much responsibility on the 
engagement partner for determining the application of and 
compliance with the independence rules (A.2.).  In view of the size 
and structure of large firms today, the framework should 
acknowledge that individual engagement partners are unable to 
ensure compliance with the independence rules by the firm and 
other firms within a network, and by firm employees able to 
influence the outcome of the audit including those in the chain of 
command.  This responsibility should rest, as the framework later 
states, with the firm, which has the ability to determine to whom 
restrictions should apply, and to put quality controls in place to 
promote and monitor compliance.  While we understand that the 
appointed statutory auditor, who may be an individual, might have 
legal responsibility in some jurisdictions for compliance, we believe 
this assignment of responsibility is unrealistic in a framework that 
extends restrictions beyond the appointed statutory auditor to a 
potentially large group of individuals in the firm, to the firm itself, 
and to other individuals and firms within a network. 
 
Limiting Restrictions to Those Able to Influence the Outcome of the 
Audit 
 
We support, in most cases, limiting restrictions to the firm and to 
those professionals with the ability to influence the outcome of the 
audit.  The requirements sometimes carry this notion too far, 
however, without obvious benefit.  Recognizing that to some extent 
the activities and relationships of firm professionals are attributed to 
the firm, we believe standards should prohibit all firm professionals 
from having certain relationships with firm audit clients.  For 
example, we do not believe that firm professionals should serve as 
employees or board members of audit clients, or act as underwriters 
for an audit client’s securities.  Similarly, none of the firm’s 
professionals should be permitted to maintain the accounting records 
of the client. 
 
In addition, while we agree that many of the financial interest 
prohibitions should be limited to those able to influence the outcome 
of the audit, some limitations should apply to other firm 
professionals.  We believe, for example, that it would be 
inappropriate for a firm to audit a company over which one or more 
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of its professionals can exercise control or significant influence.   
 
Family and Other Personal Relationships 
 
The requirements apply employment and financial restrictions to 
close family members of the engagement team and the chain of 
command (B.6).  We would distinguish between immediate and 
other close family members in applying restrictions (i.e., applying 
more stringent restrictions to immediate family members). 
 
In addition, because restrictions are applied evenly to a larger group 
of relatives, clarification is needed on the auditor’s responsibility to 
inquire about the investment holdings of, for example, parents and 
siblings.  If the auditor does not have this investigative 
responsibility, then the requirements should clarify these limits and 
state that the auditor must only act on those relationships of which 
he or she becomes aware.   
 
We believe that the auditor should be expected to have knowledge 
of the investments of those in his or her household (immediate 
family members), but not the investments of other close family 
members.  Furthermore, investments of other close family members 
can only compromise the auditor’s independence if they are known 
and are material to both the auditor and the close family member.  
 
Internal Audit Services 
 
The requirements call for review of internal audit work by a partner 
uninvolved in the statutory audit or the internal audit engagement, 
presumably when the audit team will rely on the internal audit work 
to change the nature, timing, or extent of their own procedures 
(B.7.2.4(2)(b)).  We do not believe this is necessary and would 
impose additional costs without benefit.  
 
The auditor may rely on the internal auditor’s work (control and 
substantive testing) after evaluating the internal auditor’s 
competence and objectivity, and testing the effectiveness of the 
internal auditor’s work.  Whether to rely on the internal auditor’s 
work, or to perform such work himself or herself, is the auditor’s 
prerogative and is a question of efficiency.  Since the auditor has 
this choice – to rely on the work of the internal auditor, after 
performing the required evaluations, or to have an audit team 
member perform the work, which is subject to standard review 
procedures - why are extra steps necessary when audit firm 
professionals perform internal audit work?   
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In addition, we question whether the term “the internal audit 





Fee dependency is a complex topic.  In one sense it is easier to 
assess and measure than other threats to independence, such as 
familiarity – there are hard numbers available to assist in assessing 
the significance of the client to the firm.  On the other hand, the 
significance of a client to an engagement partner’s compensation 
and career may be harder to measure; sometimes the loss of an 
average-sized client of the firm may have significant adverse 
consequences to a firm professional. The profitability of services 
provided, the reputational value of the client association, and 
whether the engagement is a recurring one must also be factored into 
the assessment.   
 
Recognizing the difficulty of the subject, we still find the guidance 
provided on fee dependency confusing and difficult to apply (B.8.2).  
The black letter guidance states that services provided should not be 
allowed to create a financial dependency on the client, in fact or 
appearance.  Later, we are told to have another audit partner 
uninvolved in the audit or in the provision of non-audit services 
review all work performed by the firm for the client if there is some 
level of dependency.  
 
We do not understand why “independence may be particularly 
compromised” by fees for non-audit services.  While additional 
focus on non-audit engagements may be appropriate when fee 
dependency is in question, because of their recurring nature, audit 
fees may pose a greater threat to the auditor’s independence than 
fees received on a one-off non-audit engagement.  
 
A test based on fees in relation to revenues in each of the last 5 
years seems liberal.  Isn’t there a question of dependency if fees 
from a client are, for example, 25% of the firm’s revenues in each of 
the last 2 years?  
 
Finally, in the black letter guidance on overdue fees, we are told that 
auditors should not accept engagements where overdue fees could 
be considered a loan.  The commentary, however, suggests that 
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The second paragraph of the black letter guidance (B.9.(2)) states 
that the auditor should “cease to act” as soon as litigation becomes 
evident, which implies resignation from the engagement.  
Resignation, however, is only one of the remedies provided in the 




We are not sure that the requirements provide enough guidance on 
the application of independence rules to entities affiliated with the 
firm in alternative practice structures. 
 
The requirements prohibit the provision of audit services to non-
auditor owners holding more than 5% of firm voting rights 
(B.4.3.1(2)).  We suggest that the prohibition also be operative if the 
stock is held by the entity’s officers, directors, or significant 
shareholders. 
 
In discussing non-audit services, the auditor is cautioned to avoid 
making decisions on behalf of the client.  The auditor is told to 
provide management with the opportunity to decide between 
reasonable alternatives, or to document the situation if legal or 
regulatory provisions allow only one course of action (B.7.1).  We 
suggest that there may be other situations where alternatives are not 




* * * * 
 
We would be pleased to discuss these comments with you.  Best 
wishes for success in this important and worthwhile project. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
Arthur Siegel 
Executive Director 
 
 
